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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Employment Discrimination -New Limitations on Appellate
Review of Teacher Employment Discrimination Suits
Discrimination in the hiring and dismissal of teachers has been a
perplexing aspect of school desegregation. The Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals has taken an active role in confronting this problem; how-
ever, in Jones v. Pitt County Board of Education' the court departed
from this pattern of intervention. Because of the restrictions it imposed
upon itself in reviewing the district court's findings, it appears that the
court intends to place the teacher employment discrimination issue
primarily within the discretion of the district courts.
The plaintiff in Jones, a black school teacher, alleged that the
county board of education was racially motivated in its refusal to renew
her contract. Mrs. Jones had been a seventh and eighth grade teacher
in an all-black school for ten years. In the implementation of a judi-
cially mandated school desegregation plan she was shifted to a fifth
grade classroom in a previously all-white school. Pursuant to the
recommendation of her principal, and requests of both the local
advisory council and the county superintendent that she not be reem-
ployed, the county board decided not to renew her contract. Mrs.
Jones sued for damages and equitable relief under 42 U.S.C. section
19832 alleging a denial of equal protection.3
The district court concluded that the board of education had
proved by clear and convincing evidence4 that Mrs. Jones's professional
incompetence and not racial discrimination was the reason for her non-
retention. Plaintiff appealed claiming that the evidence did not
support this finding of fact." She argued that the principal's written
1. 528 F.2d 414 (4th Cir. 1975).
2. "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State . . . , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States.. . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
3. The plaintiff also raised a due process issue in the trial but did not raise it
on appeal. Though not in issue, the court indicated that hearings before the advisory
council and before the board of education with counsel present at both were sufficient
under the due process clause. 528 F.2d at 415-16.
4. See text accompanying notes 12-14 infra.
5. If the court had been so inclined it could have focused upon the conclusion
of no racial discrimination and treated it as a finding of mixed fact and law. The find-
ing of no racial discrimination is a conclusory finding much like a finding of no negli-
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evaluations did not support his recommendation that her -contract not
be renewed.
In affirming, the court of appeals displayed great deference to
the lower court's finding. First, the court refused to consider plaintiff's
crucial evidence. Terming the principal's written evaluations and the
county's hiring practices6 "minutia of the evidence," the court reasoned
that they could not be reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard
of appellate review7 since this test prohibits the appellate court from
conducting a trial de novo. Next, the court stated that the "clearly
erroneous" standard must be applied without considering defendant's
burden of proving its case by "clear and convincing" evidence.8 In a
vigorous dissent Judge Craven contended that the whole record must
be examined in applying the "clearly erroneous" rule and that the rule
must always be applied in light of the standard of proof. He concluded
that, in view of the whole record, the board of education had failed to
sustain its burden of proving the plaintiff's incompetence by "clear and
convincing" evidence.9
Jones resulted from the confluence of two streams of judicial
decisions. One of these was the litigation over school desegregation
that followed Brown v. Board of Education.10 As judicially mandated
school desegregation was implemented, it became apparent that black
teachers might become casualties of the process." Because of the fre-
quent recurrence of this problem, the Fourth Circuit in Chambers v.
gence. If the finding of no discrimination is determined to be a finding of mixed fact
and law, First Nat'l Bank v. Hartford, 273 U.S. 548, 552 (1927), seems to make the
finding freely reviewable without regard to the clearly erroneous rule. See also 5A J.
MoORE, FEDERAL PRACrICE 52.05[l] (2d ed. 1975); 9 C. WRiGHT & A. MILLER, FED,-
ERAL PRAICE AND PRoCEDURE: CIviL § 2589 (1971) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT AND
MiLLER]. But cf. St. Louis v. Rutz, 138 U.S. 226, 241-42 (1891); Famous Knitwear
Corp. v. Drug Fair, Inc., 493 F.2d 251, 253 (4th Cir. 1974) (where the court said some
questions of fact and law were freely reviewable while others were not).
6. The county's new hire ratio was 6 to 1 in favor of whites. Thus, the ultimate
result of the 50-50 non-renewal rate was discriminatory. 528 F.2d 416, 420 (dissenting
opinion).
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) provides in part that: "In all actions tried upon the
facts without a jury . . . . the court shall find the facts specially and state separately
its conclusions of law thereon .... Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court
to judge of the credibility of the witnesses." For the history of Rule 52(a), see Clark
& Stone, Review of Findings of Fact, 4 U. Cm L. REv. 190 (1937).
8. 528 F.2d at 418.
9. Id. at 420.
10. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
11. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Durham City Bd. of Educ., 346 F.2d 768, 773 (4th Cir.
1965).
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Board of Education12 fashioned a remedial mechanism for exposing this
form of racial discrimination. Relying on Supreme Court cases's deal-
ig with jury discrimination in criminal trials, Chambers held that when
a history of segregation in the school system was ended only by judi-
cial decree and there was a sudden disproportionate reduction in the
number of black teachers, the school board had the burden of proving
the absence of racial discrimination by clear and convincing evidence.
14
This "clear and convincing' standard of proof has remained
nebulous in teacher employment discrimination cases. The Fourth Cir-
cuit has defined the standard as an intermediate position between "a
preponderance of the evidence" and "beyond a reasonable doubt."'' 5
Chambers indicates that the county school superintendent's assertions
of personal preference are insufficient to sustain the burden.' On the
other hand, Williams v. Board of Education' held that being late for
the start of the school year, being late with reports, and having a dispute
over corporal punishment was sufficient to sustain the board's burden
of persuasion. Other cases indicate that the court is inclined to accept
the general observations of the teacher's superiors.' 8 Although school
systems are supposed to prove their cases by clear and convincing evi-
dence, the court of appeals has generally accepted much weaker proof
in teacher employment discrimination cases than it has in other employ-
ment discrimination cases.'"
The second stream of judicial decisions influencing Jones involves
the interpretation of rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
12. 364 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1966).
13. See, e.g., Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Reece v. Georgia, 350
U.S. 85 (1955); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
14. 364 F.2d at 192. In Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 209 (1973),
the Supreme Court cited Chambers approvingly and held that racial discrimination must
not play any part in the board's actions. To determine when to apply Chambers, see, e.g.,
North Carolina Teachers Ass'n v. Asheboro City Bd. of Educ., 393 F.2d 736 (4th Cir.
1968); Wall v. Stanley County Bd. of Educ., 378 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1967). One line
of teacher employment discrimination cases deals with the National Teachers Examina-
tion. See, e.g., Walston v. County School Bd., 492 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Chesterfield County School Dist., 484 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1973).
15. Hobson v. Eaton, 399 F.2d 781, 784 n.2 (6th Cir. 1968), quoting Cross v. Led-
ford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118. Hobson also distinguished between the "clear
and convincing" standard and the "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard.
16. 364 F.2d at 191.
17. 490 F.2d 1231 (4th Cir. 1974).
18. See, e.g., Vance v. Chester County Bd. of School Trustees, 504 F.2d 820 (4th
Cir. 1974).
19. Compare cases cited in notes 16-18 supra with Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971). See also Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. 405 (1975);
Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 905 (1970); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
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dure. The classic statement20 of the "clearly erroneous" test of rule
52(a) is in United States v. United States Gypsum Co.:21 "A finding
is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed. ' '22  A simple disagree-
ment with the result or a preference for a different interpretation of the
facts does not justify reversing the lower court.23
When reviewing cases that vary the standard of proof, such as
cases that apply the Chambers rationale, the appellate court must deter-
mine how the standard of proof applied by the trial court will influence
its review under the clearly erroneous test.24  In Baumgartner v. United
States25 the Supreme Court held that in denaturalization cases, in
which the government must prove its case by "clear, unequivocal, and
convincing" evidence, it would review the findings in light of that stand-
ard of proof.20  Also, in Mortensen v. United States= the Court held
that in appeals of criminal convictions, in which the burden is "beyond
a reasonable doubt," the appellate court must consider this standard in
its review of the conviction. Since the appellate court must take into
account the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard and the "clear,
unequivocal, and convincing' standard, it logically should also consider
the "clear and convincing' standard in its review. Indeed, in the past
the Fourth Circuit had claimed to do so.
28
20. Some courts have contended that if there is substantial evidence to support the
judge's findings the findings cannot be "clearly erroneous," but that position has been
generally abandoned. See WsuosT AND MLLER, supra note 5, § 2585, at 735.
21. 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
22. Id. at 395.
23. See Guzman v. Pichirilo, 369 U.S. 698 (1962); United States v. National Ass'n
of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950); Grace Girdler, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 196 (1868).
See also Darter v. Greenville Community Hotel Corp., 301 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1962);
Jersey Ins. Co. v. Heffron, 242 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1957).
24. For a general discussion of the topic see Note, Appellate Review in the Fed-
eral Courts of Findings Requiring More Than a Preponderance of the Evidence, 60
HAv. L. REv. 111 (1946).
25. 322 U.S. 665, 670 (1944). Accord, Nowak v. United States, 356 U.S. 660
(1958),
26. In Jones the majority used Hobson (see text accompanying note 15 supra) in
an apparent attempt to distinguish the "clear and convincing" burden from the "clear,
unequivocal, and convincing" burden.
27. 322 U.S. 369, 374 (1944). But cf. Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization
Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 282 (1966).
28. Darden v. Darden, 152 F.2d 208, 209 (4th Cir. 1945), and Holt v. Quaker
State Oil Ref. Co., 67 F.2d 170, 171 (4th Cir. 1933), though not the only cases, provide
the most straightforward statements that the "clearly erroneous" review must take into
account the burden of proving by "clear and convincing" evidence.
10371976]
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Jones is unusual29 in that the court of appeals expressly refused
to consider the clear and convincing standard of proof when re-
viewing the case, even though it displayed no inclination to abandon
the Chambers principle of increasing the standard of proof when there
has been a history of segregation in the school district that persisted
after Brown. Furthermore, the court applied Chambers without ques-
tioning whether there had been a rapid and disproportionate reduction
in the number of black teachers.30 It is therefore perplexing that the.
court in Jones would refuse to consider the standard of proof imposed
at the trial stage when applying the clearly erroneous test while con-
tinuing to display such strong support for Chambers.
The majority3' relied on Oburn v. Shapp,32 which held that the
court would not consider the "compelling state interest" test in review-
ing a district court's denial of a preliminary injunction. 3 Oburn, how-
ever, provides only weak support for the majority's position. First,
there is a difference between the "compelling state interest" criterion
at issue in Oburn and the "clear and convincing" standard of proof
in Jones. Secondly, Oburn was an appeal from the denial of a pre-
liminary injunction, not an appeal from a final judgment; therefore, the
question before the court was whether the trial court had abused its
discretion, not whether the trial court was clearly erroneous in its find-
ings of fact.34
29. See notes 24, 26 & 28 supra.
30. One criterion for the application of Chambers had been a large and rapid re-
duction in the proportion of black teachers. Williams is another example, though not
the only one, of the court's application of Chambers without any question as to the pro-
portion of black teachers not retained. Perhaps the court has been influenced by Keyes
which made no comparable requirement (however, Keyes did not deal directly with
teacher employment discrimination). Jones clarifies the court's stance in applying
Chambers. In Morton v. Charles County Bd. of Educ., 520 F.2d 871 (4th Cir. 1975),
the court had refused to apply the Chambers approach where the school system, though
segregated at the time of the Brown decision, had moved immediately to desegregate.
31. The dissent in Jones relied on two cases, Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Sun Oil Co.,
229 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 973 (1956), and Soccodato v.
Dulles, 226 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1955), that held that the clear, unequivocal, and con-
vincing standard of proof must be considered in applying the clearly erroneous test. The
dissent reasoned that since the court was obliged to consider the clear, unequivocal, and
convincing standard in applying the clearly erroneous test, it should also consider the
clear and convincing standard in applying the same test. 528 F.2d at 419. The ma-
jority distinguished both the dissent's cases and the denaturalization cases (see notes 24,
25, and 27 supra) by differentiating the clear and convincing standard used in Jones
from the clear, unequivocal, and convincing standard used in the other cases. See note
15 supra.
32. 521 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1975).
33. Id. at 149 n.19.
34. Id. at 147.
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In Chambers the court justified its original reallocation of the bur-
den of proof" by the fact that the school board had the power to pro-
duce the facts.38 This reasoning obviously supports the court's shifting
to the school board the burden of coming forward with he evidence.
The logical connection between determining who has access to the facts
and imposing the "clear and convincing!' standard of proof is less clear.
Since only one party has access to most of the relevant facts, the adver-
sary process by itself will not insure adequate fact production. There-
fore, the court can assure itself of adequate fact production by imposing
the burden of producing the evidence on the party having access to the
facts and increasing the standard of proof. While the court has not
abandoned the Chambers approach, Jones implies that, ii the future,
district courts will have exclusive authority in applying the "clear and
convincing" standard. So far as appellate review is concerned, how-
ever, the court has settled for half a loaf. By tacitly retaining oversight
of the shifting of the burden of coming forward with the evidence, it
can be assured of some fact production, but by abandoning further
examination of the use of the clear and convincing standard of proof,
the court can no longer assure itself of adequate fact production.
The second significant aspect of Jones is the court's refusal to
examine the evidence fully. The Supreme Court has cautioned that
"[i]n applying the clearly erroneous standard to the findings of a district
court sitting without a jury, appellate courts must constantly have in
mind that their function is not to decide factual issues de novo. '37 The
Court, however, has also stated that in its review the appellate court
must consider the whole of the evidence.38 In American Football
League v. National Football League the Fourth Circuit focused upon
the latter requirement when it stated that it had been obliged to review
all the evidence.39
The refusal of the Jones court to consider the "minutia of the
evidence" in its review is the court's most radical departure from
accepted authority. The majority based its refusal on the Supreme
35. See C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 336-41 (2d ed.
1972), for a discussion of burden of proof.
36. 364 F.2d at 192.
37. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969).
38. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395
(1948); Garsed v. Beall, 92 U.S. 684, 695 (1875). WRIGHT AND MILLER, supra note 5,.
§ 2585, at 731, suggests that the prohibition against a trial de novo does not prevent
examining all the evidence.
39. 323 F.2d 124, 134 (4th Cir. 1963).
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Court's prohibition against conducting a de novo trial.40 The dissent,
on the other hand, emphasized that the Supreme Court required appel-
late courts to consider the record as a whole4" even when reviewing
decisions of administrative agencies, which had traditionally been shown
more deference than those of trial courts. Judge Craven contended
that the court must therefore consider the minutia of the evidence in
order to review the record as a whole. 2 Such an examination in Jones
reveals that the objective evaluation forms filled out by the principal
tended to dispute his recommendation not to retain plaintiff. Thus, the
majority's manipulation of the trial de novo concept not only forbids
consideration of critical evidence but also violates the policy adopted
by the court in American Football League of reviewing all the
evidence.43
Although the court's approach has not been expressly prohibited44
by the Supreme Court, it does seem to violate the policy for a review
of the whole record. If the court can use the "minutia of the evidence!'
phrase to close off its consideration of proof that conflicts with the trial
judge's findings of fact, then appellate review will be nothing more than
a formal expression of the whims of the appellate court. The clearly
erroneous rule, while it does limit appellate review of a trial court's
findings of fact, should not be used to make the right to review mean-
ingless. The Supreme Court once stated: "The right of appeal
is a substantial right, and not a shadow. . . . [W]e may not
abdicate the performance of the duty which the law imposes upon us
by declining to give our own judicial effect."'45  The Jones court's re-
fusal to review the whole record is that kind of abdication of duty.
Perhaps Jones is merely the court's response to a questionable
lower court decision that it desired to affirm. On the other hand, the
case suggests a more basic decision by the court to restrict its review
under the clearly erroneous test. If Jones is followed, appeals by
40. 528 F.2d at 418, quoting Zenith Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S.
100, 123 (1969).
41. 528 F.2d at 419-20. The dissent relied on Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
340 U.S. 474 (1951).
42. 528 F.2d at 419-20.
43. See authorities cited notes 38 & 39 supra.
44. If the court were inclined to review these cases more closely, it could use the
"constitutional fact" doctrine to free its review from the "clearly erroneous" rule.
See Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110, 121 (1954); Guzick v. Drebus, 431
F.2d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 1970); Strong, Dilemmic Aspects of the Doctrine of "Constitu-
tional Fact," 47 N.C.L. Rlv. 311 (1969); Strong, The Persistent Doctrine of "Constitu-
tional Fact," 46 N.C.L. REv. 223 (1968).
45. The Ariadne, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 475, 479 (1871).
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teachers from adverse district court decisions will be virtually meaning-
less. The teacher's primary weapon has been the "clear and con-
vincing" standard of proof imposed on the local school boards. On
review, that standard will be ignored. Furthermore, the court can
manipulate the "minutia of the evidence" phrase to avoid meaningful
review of the lower court's findings. The potential effect of Jones,
however, extends beyond the teacher employment discrimination issue.
In the past, appellate courts have delved into intricate evidence in other
kinds of employment discrimination cases to expose underlying dis-
crimination. The "minutia of the evidence" phrase can be easily
manipulated by a busy appellate court to avoid such time-consuming
analysis. If Jones represents the beginning of a trend in the extent
of appellate review by the Fourth Circuit, the right of appellate review
may become no more than a shadow of what it once was.
NIGLE B. BARRow, JR.
Evidence-A New Approach to Character Evidence in North
Carolina
In 1904 Professor Wigmore stated that although the Anglo-Ameri-
can rules of evidence had "taken some curious twistings in the course of
their development," none was more curious than the rule limiting the
admissibility of character evidence only to that of the general communi-
ty-reputation of 'the person in question.' This rule has generated con-
tinuous debate by legal theoreticians and scholars, but the case law has
remained unchanged for almost seventy-five years. State v. Stegmann
is another curious twist in this area of the law; the North Carolina
Supreme Court departed from precedent and the traditional rule and
held admissible testimony about the character and reputation of the
1. 11I J. WIGMORn, EVIDENCE § 1986 (1st ed. 1904). An analysis of this issue
must first differentiate between the terms "character" and "reputation." "Character"
refers to the actual qualities and characteristics of an individual, while "reputation" is
the esteem in which a person is held by others. I D. STANSHURY, NoRT- CARoLrNA
EVIENCE § 102 (Brandis rev. 1973). As the court stated in State v. Ussery, 118 N.C.
1177, 1180, 24 S.E. 414, 415 (1896), "Some critic has said that character lives in a
man-reputation outside of him." Unfortunately, judicial decisions have tended to use
the terms interchangeably and thus obscure the distinction. V J. WIGMORE, EViDENCE §
1608 (3d ed. 1940).
2. 286 N.C. 638, 213 S.E.2d 262 (1975).
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